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I. INTRODUCTION 
Schooling is everywhere and inevitably a manipulator of con-
sciousness, an inculcator of values in young minds. This article 
addresses the school's imposition of values and the school's relation to 
the first amendment's guarantee offreedom of expression. Some of the 
practical implications of the first amendment critique of schooling .are 
discussed. The emphasis, however, is upon examining the ways in 
which first amendment rights are threatened by the structure and ideol-
ogy of American schooling, not upon the evaluation of particular 
strategies for change. 1 
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1 Throughout this Article we speak of imposition of values by the government or 
state because the government is the vehicle through which political power has tradi-
tionally been exercised. We do not discuss the imposition of the same beliefs by 
corporations or private school proprietors, who are not normally considered agents of 
the government. We further limit our discussion of government regulation or inculca-
tion of values to the school setting. In the final analysis, the presence of government 
intervention, or "state action," is determined by the Court's willingness to extend the 
protection of the Constitution to a particular activity. State action is a flexible doctrine 
that has expanded and contracted with the Court's predilection for protecting civil 
liberties. Cf. L. TIUBE, AMEIUCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1173-74 (1978) (deter-
mination of whether there is state action involves consideration of the reach of particu-
lar constitutional provisions). We have not directly addressed the propriety of holding 
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In Part II of this Article, we reevaluate the nature of first amend-
ment protections, applying one of the amendment's central themes to 
the structure of contemporary education. In Part ITI we detail some of 
the conflicts between this view of the first amendment and the present 
educational system. In Part IV we examine racism as a constitutional 
and practical problem, given an interpretation of the first amendment 
as calling for both greater family liberty in choosing schools and 
greater family control of value inculcation within schools. 
The problem of racism commands our attention 1) because dis-
proportionate percentages of the poor and working class are the vic-
tims of consciousness manipulation in government schools, and racial 
minorities are overrepresented in the poor and working class; 2) 
because a clear implication of our argument about the school's 
infringement of first amendment rights is that equal choice in school-
ing must be provided for all families, but "family choice" has histori-
cally been a code word for the preservation of racially segregated and 
stigmatizing schools; and 3) because racism has been the most persis-
tent and pernicious flaw in American schooling. 
We deal throughout with problems that have traditionally been 
understood as questions of equality in the social order or of due process 
of law. We do not dispute these traditional understandings, but we try 
to refocus the problems in terms of their relationship to the first amend-
ment, whose explicit enumeration of the freedoms of religion, speech, 
press, assembly and petition establishes the foundation of the freedom 
of expression. The operation of a system of free expression is central 
to the constitutional order and indeed to our humanity, for, as Paulo 
Freire recognizes, dialogue among men is essential to their liberation 
from oppression: "men ... cannot be truly human apart from com-
munication, for they are essentially communicative creatures. To 
impede communication is to reduce men to the status of 'things' 
"2 
the body politic accountable for the actions of other powerful organizations that it 
allows to stand in its place. However, our argument for an expanded interpretation of 
the substance of the first amendment suggests the need for a view of state action that is 
able to accommodate that interpretation. 
2 P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1968, 1970 trans.). See especially 
id. at 57-74. 
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
OF THE FORMATION OF BELIEFS 
A. The Traditional First Amendment Conception 
311 
This section will outline the relation of first amendment protec-
tions to the problem of manipulation of belief and opinion by schools.3 
In this context we view the first amendment not only as a collection of 
interconnected personal rights but as the linchpin of a system of free 
expression4 and open political decisionmaking. 
The need to examine and further develop a theoretical under-
standing of the first amendment is accentuated by the problem of 
applying the amendment to social institutions that neither existed nor 
were contemplated at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted. Among 
all the institutions that have arisen since the end of the eighteenth 
century, perhaps the most complex and problematical one for first 
amendment analysis is universal and compulsory schooling. 
It has been observed that the various first amendment rights are 
reflections of a single intent and understanding on the part of the 
framers of the Constitution.s Expressed in terms of the traditional 
understanding of politics and personality, this conception treated the 
individual as the central unit of political and social being, free to 
develop in his own, way, to express himself and to engage in the 
3 A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1948); POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. 
er. REv. 245; What Does the First Amendment Mean? 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461 
(1953). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the 
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); cf. Comment, By Any Other Name: 
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment and School Desegregation, 3 CONN. L. REV. 299 
(1971). 
4 See Brennan supra note 3. A major work that explores first amendment theory 
is T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). 
See also N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEWBORNE & S. LAW, EMERSON, HABER,AND 
DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1979). 
5 Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, sllpra note 3, at 463: 
Apparently all they could make their words do was to link together five 
separate demands which had been sharpened by ages of conflict and were 
being popularly urged in the name of the "Freedom of the People." And 
yet, those demands were, and were felt to be, varied forms of a single 
demand. 
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struggle to mold social institutions and public policy without govern-
ment interference. 6 The first amendment is thus a statement of the 
dignity and worth of every individual, of the value of a "single 
human souI,"7 of the fact that the government exists for the benefit of 
the people and not the people for the benefit of the government. 
The particular freedoms of press , speech and assembly are part of 
the system that guarantees individual and group expression and insures 
that opinions and beliefs are freely given and exchanged in a market-
place of ideas. 8 Self-expression, which is an end in itself, and the fair 
and reliable making of public policy are thus both served by the spe-
cific first amendment protections. 
B. Belief Expression and Belief Formation 
To implement this conception of the first amendment in the world 
of universal, institutionalized education requires a broadening of the 
amendment's traditional protection of expression of belief and opinion 
to embrace formatioll of belief and opinion. As will be seen in apply-
ing first amendment principles to institutionalized education, expres-
sion and formation are not as separate in human interaction as they 
have been analytically. 
Free expression makes unfettered formulation of beliefs and opin-
ions possible. In turn, free formulation of beliefs and opinions is a 
necessary precursor to freedom of expression. If the government were 
to regulate the development of ideas and opinions through, for exam-
ple, a single television monopoly or through religious rituals for chil-
dren, freedom of expression would become a meaningless right. The 
more the government regulates formation of beliefs so as to interfere 
with personal consciousness, the fewer people can conceive dissenting 
ideas or perceive contradictions between self-interest and government-
sustained ideological orthodoxy. If freedom of expression protected 
only communication of ideas, totalitarianism and freedom of expres-
sion could be characteristics of the same society. 
ing). 
Connecting the theme of the dignity of the individual with an 
6 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, supra note 3, at 254-56. 
7 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 469 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
8 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
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understanding of how personal development may be influenced by a 
pervasive, child-rearing institution such as a school suggests a new 
formulation of first amendment principles: the development as well as 
the expression of those beliefs, opinions, world views and aspects of 
conscience that constitute individual consciousness should be free of 
government manipulation. The notion of manipulation here refers not 
to the effectiveness of any particular technique of value inculcation, 
but to government control over what values are taught. The individual 
ought to control his own education, or, where the individual is too 
young to make an informed and voluntary choice, his parents ought to 
control it. This formulation of the modern meaning of the first amend-
ment suggests that individual human consciousness should be pro-
tected from coercion by the state, whether that coercion takes the form 
of religious indoctrination,9 the involuntary administering of psy-
choactive drugs, 10 the elimination of nonpublic schooling II or a gov-
ernment monopoly of television broadcasting. Today, the opportunity 
to manipulate consciousness precedes and may do away with the need 
to manipulate expression. 
Dispensing with individual consent or sacrificing individual con-
trol to government-sponsored manipulations of consciousness renders 
individual expression a sham. But more important to the first 
amendment's position as the linchpin of constitutional democracy is 
the effect that consciousness manipulation has upon the political pro-
cess and the political sovereignty of the individual. 
Alexander Meiklejohn, has articulated a useful understanding of 
individual consciousness and the first amendment by focusing on the 
realm of political action. 12 According to Meiklejohn, the first amend-
9 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
10 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979). In ruling that a mental 
patient is entitled to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations, Judge Tauro relied 
not only upon the patient's right to privacy, but upon his first amendment rights: "The 
First Amendment protects the communication of ideas. That protected right of com-
munication presupposes a capacity to produce ideas. As a practical matter, therefore, 
the power to produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and is 
entitled to comparable constitutional protection." [d. at 1367. 
1\ Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
12 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, supra note 3, at 255-56. 
Meiklejohn emphasizes the importance to the political process of protecting the forma-
tion of beliefs in modern society. However, individual development and expression 
should be protected for their own sake as well. 
314 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 15 
ment is meant as an absolute protection for individuals in exercising 
their electoral power, not simply in voting, but in all those activities of 
thought, communication and belief formation that inform the electoral 
powerl3 or are part of the right of self-government guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Any exercise of the freedom of speech, press, assembly 
or petition is protected from any government abridgment "whenever 
those activities are utilized for the governing of the nation."14 
Meiklejohn's enumeration of the freedoms necessarily related to the 
informed exercise of electoral power under the first amendment is 
expansive, including public discussion of public issues, together with 
the dissemination of information and opinion, literature and the arts, 
the achievements of philosophy and the sciences in creating knowledge 
and understanding, and education in all its phases. IS Any activity is 
protected if it can reasonably be described as related to the kinds of 
thought or expression which ultimately are part of the governing role 
of citizens. 16 
According to Meiklejohn's theory, although some regulation of 
communication may be permitted under the amendment (chiefly regu-
lation of the incidents of speaking or other freedoms, not their con-
tent), no regulation of belief can be tolerated: 
A citizen may be told when and where and in what manner 
he mayor may not speak, write, assemble, and so on. On the 
other hand, he may not be told what he shall or shall not 
believe. In that realm, each citizen is sovereign. He exer-
cises powers that the body politic reserves for its own mem-
bers.17 
The logic of Meiklejohn's formulation suggests that the society 
that can utilize institutional power to reduce an individual's control 
over the development of personal consciousness has made that indi-
13 [d. at 254. 
14 [d. at 256. 
IS [d. 
16 [d. at 257. 
17 [d. at 257-58. But see A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 3, 
at 79-82 (arguing that the first amendment protects only speech directed towards 
debating the common good; speech directed towards private interests is entitled only to 
due process protection). 
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vidual politically impotent. Under these conditions the government 
becomes a kind of political perpetual motion machine, legitimizing its 
policies through the public opinion it creates. The protection of the 
governing powers of the individual through the first amendment is a 
necessary part of a system that relies upon the just consent of the 
governed. Every citizen must participate in making these decisions, 
not out of loyalty to some idealized notion of democracy, but out of a 
sense of self-preservation. The right to vote, the freedoms of expres-
sion and belief enumerated in the first amendment, the legitimate 
formation of political majorities and public policy all are knit together 
in making the dignity and political powers of the individual meaning-
ful. 
Those who are prevented from making themselves heard or 
whose participation in public affairs is restricted by government inter-
vention are not only stunted in personal development and human 
interaction, but also become the victims of others who are better able 
to understand and express their own interests or their personal versions 
of the general welfare. Although an understanding of the first amend-
ment begins with a recognition of the specific freedoms of expression, 
it ultimately involves the capacity to be human and the ability to 
participate in political action, to acquire and produce knowledge and to 
transform such knowledge into power that affects the conditions of 
daily life. 
C. Schooling and Belief Formation 
There is a reciprocal relationship between schooling and this 
modernized view of the first amendment. The application of the 
amendment to schooling suggests ways of rethinking the amendment's 
meaning; the revised understandings of the amendment shed new light 
on the function and effect of American education. 
It is commonplace to recognize that schools, as institutions occu-
pying a substantial portion of a child's waking life, ought to respect the 
first amendment rights of students. While the law has recognized that 
teachers and students do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"18 most cases 
18 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969). 
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have dealt with the right of the individual to be free of specifically 
imposed restrictions of expression. 19 It is also commonplace to hear 
that by teaching basic skills of communication as well as knowledge 
and patterns of thought, schools are preparing children to exercise 
those political freedoms that are at the core of democratic activity. 20 
What remains largely unconfronted is the pervasiveness of value trans-
mission in the schools. In practice, the choice of values to be trans-
mitted lies not with the child or the child's family,21 but with the 
political majority or interest group in charge of the school system.22 
The specific restrictions on freedom of press or speech imposed by 
school authorities arc more properly recognized as the most obvious 
and superficial examples of restrictions on first amendment rights im-
bedded in schooling. Even when a school bends over backwards (as it 
almost never does) to provide all points of view about ideas and issues 
in the classroom, it barely scratches the surface of its system of value 
19 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
20 "The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. The nation's future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues .... " Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. 
Supp. 362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
21 This Article does not attempt to resolve the difficult issue of whose choice of 
school should prevail, the child's or the parents'. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205,241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (Court should consider views of Amish 
children in determining whether they are to receive a secular or religious education). 
Still, it is in the nature of childhood that some institution or person will have the 
primary influence over the formation of values held by the young. For purposes of this 
essay, family choice and individual rights are used interchangeably. This reflects the 
need to understand the coercion applied in schools, and leaves for another essay the 
generation of principles capable of resolving contests between the child and the family 
over value choice and schooling decisions. 
22 This problem was perceived more than 100 years ago by John Stuart Mill: 
[S]tate-sponsored education ... is a mere contrivance for moulding people 
to be exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it casts them is that 
which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a 
monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing genera-
tion, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism 
over the mind .... 
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 190-91 (1859). 
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inculcation. 23 A school must still confront its hidden curriculum-the 
role models teachers provide, the structure of classrooms and of 
teacher-student relationships, the way in which the school is governed, 
the ways in which the child's time is parceled out, learning subdivided 
and fragmented, attitudes and behaviors rewarded and punished. Even 
in those areas concerned with basic skills it is clear that teaching is 
never value-neutral, that texts, teachers, subject matter and atmo-
sphere convey messages about approved and rewarded values and 
ideas.24 It is unlikely that any amount of "equal time" for other points 
of view will reduce this effect. 2S 
Most parents of children about to begin school want to know 
whether their children will be helped to learn to read or do mathe-
matics or develop physical dexterity, but hardly anyone stops with 
these questions. Whatever their values, most parents seem to recognize 
that a good deal of child rearing will take place at school and that the 
school is a social environment from which a child may learn much 
more than the formal curriculum. Schooling alters the child's concept 
of reality and, therefore, his perception of and reaction to all things. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that value inculcation is 
inherent in schooling. Thus far, however, the Court has found such 
value inculcation to be unconstitutional only in its more overt forms or 
when the values involved are religious. 
23 The social science research examining value inculcation in schools includes 
the following: on sex-role stereotypes, Sarrio, Tittle & Jacklin, Sex Role Stereotyping 
in the Public Schools, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 386 (1973); on political ideology and 
cognitive structure, Lightfoot, Politics and Reasoning: Through the Eyes of Teachers 
and Children, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 197 (1973); on individualism, achievement and 
the categorization of persons, D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (1961), 
especially at 453-74, P. BREER & F. LOCKE, TASK EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF 
ATTITUDES (1965), and Dreeben, The Contribution of Schooling to the Learning of 
Norms, 37 HARV. EDUC. REV. 211 (1967). 
24 Of course, value inculcation is an extremely complex phenomenon whose 
effectiveness cannot be measured simply by looking for children whose values match 
those of the school. Some children will react by swallowing whole the values that are 
put forth didactically or in the hidden curriculum. Others will only pretend to agree 
with the prevailing orthodoxy while suppressing internal tensions ranging from per-
sonal alienation to confusion and loss of identity. The variety of such reactions is 
explored in the setting of "total institutions" in Erving Goffman's ASYLUMS (1961). 
2S The validity of the widely accepted belief that the best way to educate young 
children is to place them in an educational and intellectual crossfire in order to give 
equal emphasis to differing values remains to be proven. 
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In the landmark cases of Pierce v. Society of Sisters 26 and Meyer 
v. Nebraska,27 the Court placed limits on the power of the state to 
promote homogeneity in its schools.28 In Pierce, the Court invalidated 
a state statute which required all students to attend public school. In 
striking the law down, the Court noted that "the child is not the mere 
creature of the state' '29 and ruled that the Constitution's "fundamental 
theory of liberty" "excludes any general power of the State to stan-
dardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
teachers only. "30 A central concern of the Court seems to have been 
preserving the right of families to direct the upbringing of their chil-
dren without unreasonable interference from the political majority.31 In 
Meyer the Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the teach-
ing of modern languages to young children, finding this an impermis-
sible means of fostering "a homogeneous people with American 
ideals.' '32 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,33 the 
Court held invalid under the first amendment a statute which com-
pelled public school students to salute the flag. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Jackson noted that the pledge was a form of utterence which 
required "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. "34 He went 
on to point out that the case did not turn solely on the religion clauses 
of the first amendment but was based on the amendment's broader 
protection of nonconforming beliefs. In perhaps the Court's most 
absolute declaration of the freedom of individual consciousness, 
Jackson said, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
26 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
21 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
28 While both cases were decided under the substantive due process doctrine that 
prevailed during the first part of this century, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), the values that the Court sought to protect are among those encom-
passed by the first amendment theory advanced here. See Arons, Separation o/School 
and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. REv. 76 (1976). 
29 268 U.S. at 535. 
30/d. 
31 /d. at 534-35. 
32 262 U.S. at 402. 
33319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
34 /d. at 633. 
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orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein .... "35 
As we will argue in the third section of this Article, the current 
system of education forces students "to confess by word or act" in a 
variety of ways that have not been attacked by courts or legislatures. 
Nevertheless, Barnette remains a powerful formulation of the uncon-
stitutionality of state-imposed orthodoxy and of the intimate relation-
ship between holding and expressing beliefs. 
In Abington School District v. Schempp 36 the Court recognized 
that attempts to inculcate value orthodoxy through Bible readings or 
the recitation of prayer were unconstitutional. The Court stressed the 
need for governmental neutrality with respect to all religious "ortho-
doxies' '37 and erected a wall to separate church and state in the area of 
school prayer. The Court tried to prevent religious factionalization of 
political institutions and to preserve the governmental neutrality 
toward religion that is part of first amendment doctrine. 38 
Although recognizing the danger of inculcation of religious 
values or establishment of religion in schools, the Court has failed to 
consider the first amendment implications involved when equally basic 
but nonreligious values form a part of the philosophy established by a 
school and communicated to its students.39 Perhaps the case in which 
the law has most clearly ignored the similarities between religious and 
secular socialization is Wisconsin v. Yoder,40 in which the Amish 
3S [d. at 642. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 105 (1977), in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a district court order enjoining the arrest or prosecution oftwo 
Jehovah's Witnesses for covering the "Live Free or Die" motto on their New 
Hampshire license plate. The Court vindicated the Maynards' claimed moral, reli-
gious and political objections in language applicable to many free speech claims: "The 
First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different 
from the majority and to refuse tofoster . .. an idea they find morally objectionable." 
430 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added). The Court then balanced the Maynards' free 
speech interests against the state's interest in displaying the motto and held that 
"where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to 
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid 
becoming the courier for such message," 430 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added). 
36 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
37 [d. at 223. 
38 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680 (1969). 
39 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
40 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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community of Wisconsin was granted a constitutional exemption from 
compulsory high school attendance. The Court ruled that attendance at 
a high school would impose value conflicts and alienation which 
would destroy the Amish religious community and violate its first 
amendment right of free exercise of religion. In making its ruling, the 
Court enumerated Amish objections to high school socialization 
which, although religiously based for the Amish, are equally impor-
tant to parents with no religious affiliation or background: 
The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scien-
tific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, 
worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish 
society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing, a life 
of "goodness" rather than a life of intellect, wisdom rather 
than technical knowledge, community welfare rather than 
competition, and separation rather than integration with con-
temporary worldly society.41 
The Court thus recognized that socialization is an integral part of 
schooling and at the same time limited the constitutional impact of that 
recognition to religious issues. 42 
D. The First Amendment and the Fourteellfh 
Amendme1lt: Twin Guardia1ls of the 
Political Process 
While value inculcation under the present structure of public edu-
cation threatens the debate in the marketplace among ideas that the first 
amendment seeks to insure,43 we must not overlook the fact that 
schools influence the quantity and quality of that debate both by trans-
mitting values alien to those of many families and also by transmitting 
important skills and knowledge in an unequal manner. Not only are the 
41 [d. at211. 
42 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Yoder limited the protection of the 
Constitution to those with religious rather than secular objections, 406 U.S. at 
215-16, and implicitly to those whose religions were traditional, id. at 235-36. See 
id. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority's emphasis on the 
"law and record" of the Amish). 
43 See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra. 
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values of the more powerful groups in our society imbedded in the 
official and invisible curricula of our public and private schools, but 
the children of the value imposers have greater access to the skills and 
information crucial to the effective articulation of their own interests. 
Segregation, suspensions and expulsions, standardized tests and track-
ing, and unequal resource allocation all operate to deprive some stu-
dents (disproportionately minorities and the poor) of skills, informa-
tion and attitudes that would enable them to speak and act more effec-
tively. 
Such problems have traditionally been thought to involve ques-
tions of equality rather than of free expression.44 It is not suggested 
that they are problems which no longer require active redress under the 
equal protection clause; rather, it should be recognized that such prac-
tices conflict with both the first and the fourteenth amendments which 
stand as twin guardians of the democratic process. Just as one aim of 
the first amendment is to foster intelligent self-government,45 the four-
teenth amendment is directed in part at protecting the right to partici-
pate in the political process.46 Because education is vital not only to 
44 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in 
the Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1973); Yodof, Suspension and Expulsion 
of Black Students From the Public Schools: Academic Capital Punishment and the 
Constitution, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 374, 379 (1975). For a discussion of the 
disparate impact of school disciplinary procedures on poor and minority children from 
the perspective of the due process and equal protection clauses, see Hawkins v. 
Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1978) and the cases and studies collected in 
note 71 infra. 
4S See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
46 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 
(1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
In outlawing segregation of public facilities such as beaches and parks, the 
Supreme Court seems to have abandoned the rather meaningless distinction it made in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544,551-52 (1896), between "social" and "po-
litical" equality. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 485,494 (1954), the Court 
quoted approvingly the district court's finding that "[a] sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation ... therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the 
educational and mental development of negro children .... " Although the Supreme 
Court's opinion in BrolVll dealt only with the inequality inherent in segregated 
schools, a subsequent series of per curiam decisions declaring the segregation of public 
facilities unconstitutional made it clear that the BrolVll holding extended to areas that 
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the effective exercise of the ballot but also to effective participation in 
the political process that precedes and follows an election,47 the first 
and fourteenth amendments are both implicated by inequalities in the 
educational system. 
As will be discussed in the third section, the constitutional prob-
lems raised by unequal access to educational opportunity are inter-
twined with those created by value inculcation. To the extent that 
schools provide minority and poor children with fewer skills and less 
information, such children will be relatively less able to hold their own 
in a political debate that involves the increasingly complex issues of 
our technocratic society. In addition to being well informed, effective 
participants in the political process must understand what is in their 
the Plessy Court's definition would have considered social. See, e.g., State Athletic 
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic contests); New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks); Holmes v. City of 
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (involving public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. 
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). By using per curiam decisions in 
these cases, the Court again avoided the opportunity to controvert the Plessy dicta 
distinguishing "social" from "political" equality. See also Karst, Equality as a 
Celltral Prillciple ill the First Amelldmellf, 43 U. Qu. L. REV. 20 (1975); Lawrence, 
Segregatioll "Misullderstood": The Milliken Decisioll Revisited, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 
15 (1977). 
47 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.!, 113-14 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting): 
Of particular importance is the relationship between education and the 
political process. "Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic 
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government." 
Abillgtoll School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,230 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). Education serves the essential function of instilling in our 
young an understanding of and appreciation of the principles and operation 
of our governmental processes. Education may instill the interest and pro-
vide the tools necessary for political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has 
frequently been suggested that education is the dominant factor affecting 
political consciousness and participation. A system of "[c]ompetition in 
ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of 
the First Amendment freedoms." 
See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,608,487 P.2d 1241, 1258,96 Cal. Reptr. 
601,618 (1971) ("At a minimum, education makes more meaningful the casting ofa 
ballot. More significantly, it is likely to provide the understanding of, and the interest 
in, public issues which are the spur to involvement in other civic and political activi-
ties.") . 
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own self-interest. If schools expose children only to values and ideas 
that buttress the status quo and legitimize the position of those in 
power, it is unlikely that those who are presently oppressed will learn 
the cause of their oppression or the means of overcoming it. 48 
Similarly, effective political participation requires a positive self-
identity, a sense of self-worth enabling one to believe that one deserves 
fair treatment and that one is capable of doing something about unfair 
treatment. If the values expressed in our schools convince minority 
children that they are worthless, then they are deprived of that quality 
most essential for political self-preservation: the desire to preserve 
themselves. 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 49 the Supreme Court found that 
segregated schools stigmatized black children and that the resulting 
sense of inferiority made it more difficult for them to learn. 50 The 
Court held that this cause-and-effect relationship made segregated 
schools inherently unequal. 51 The same stigma operates to minimize 
the ability of black children to be effective self-interested participants 
in the political debate. Because the segregated individual is labeled as 
inferior to his fellow citizens, his thoughts and words are given less 
weight when political affairs are discussed. If he accepts the stigma he 
may mistrust his own ideas and perceptions and feel that his interests 
deserve less protection. The stigma of segregation restricts the ability 
of blacks to participate in the political process, and thus impairs their 
first as well as fourteenth amendment rights. 
The refocusing of first amendment principles on formation of 
ideas rather than on communication, and on political power rather than 
on self-development should clarify rather than blur other formulations 
of the importance and meaning of the first amendment. But at the same 
time, a revised understanding of the first amendment raises new prob-
lems of interpretation and of conflict with other aspects of the Consti-
tution. Attempting to apply a modernized understanding of the amend-
ment to schooling creates an opportunity to explore f:ome of these 
48 While children will doubtless learn a great deal in settings outside the school, 
the school system is the repository of the skills and accompanying credentials that are 
necessary for access to society'S decisionmaking forums. See text accompanying notes 
65-69 infra. 
49 347 U.S. 485 (1954). 
50 [d. at 494. 
51 [d. at 495. 
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problems and test the usefulness of invoking the Constitution to protect 
individual consciousness. This application will also point the way to 
some new understandings of the nature of schooling and education 
policy. 
III. APPLYING THE THEORY TO PRESENT REALITY: 
FORCEFUL DENIAL OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
LIBERTIES 
Government-run schooling, universal, compulsory and publicly 
supported, has traditionally been viewed by most Americans as an 
essential democratic institution. According to this view, schooling 
teaches skills necessary to the exercise of the rights of citizenship, is 
required for survival in our economic system and inculcates in the 
rising generation those values and attitudes which support democratic 
institutions. In its more rapturous moments, the teaching profession 
and educators have claimed not only that schooling is the bulwark of 
democracy in America, but that the schools are the nation's primary 
agency for eliminating social ills, inoculating against anti-American-
ism and perfecting the personal and national character. 52 
This equation of the American school system with social democ-
racy and personal liberty, may be more self-serving than self-evident. 
In fact, American schooling may be structured in a way that undercuts 
the most basic freedoms of democracy. For at the heart of American 
school ideology is the belief that schooling decisions, like most gov-
ernmental decisions, are the proper province of the political majority. 
Majoritarian control over the basic cultural and political values 
institutionalized in public schools is tolerable to some parents only 
because they are constitutionally guaranteed the right to choose a non-
public school for their children. 53 It is made tolerable to others because 
they can afford to move their homes to those school districts in which 
they feel their aspirations, beliefs and life-styles are reflected in the 
schools their children attend. These escape hatches exist for very few, 
52 A historical review of the ideology supporting compulsory schooling may be 
found in Everhart, Compulsory School Attendance Laws, 47 REV. OF EDUC. RE-
SEARCH 499 (1977). See also M. KATZ, IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM (1968); D. 
NASAW, SCHOOLED TO ORDER (1979); D. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974). 
53 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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and the poor and working class are saddled with schooling decisions 
that they do not control and do not like. 54 It is significant that in this 
situation so few people have expressed the belief that school decisions 
are so personal in origin and meaning that they ought to be classed, 
along with religion and freedom of speech and press, as beyond the 
reach of the majority. Majoritarian control of the transmission of per-
sonal beliefs through schooling is a problem whose magnitude is 
equalled only by our refusal to hold public discussions about it. 
A. The First Amendment 
and Family Choice of Schools 
The Supreme Court has eliminated religious indoctrination in 
public schools55 but, as we have argued in Section II, the imposition of 
secular values may constitute as significant an interference with first 
amendment values as the imposition of religious beliefs. Yet, except 
when dealing with overt instances of value inculcation such as the 
compulsory flag salute,56 the Court has left the establishment of other 
ideologies untouched. 57 
Having forbidden such overt value inculcation, the government 
has adopted a "neutral" stance regarding belief formation. The gov-
ernment allows families to inculcate their own values by choosing 
private schools. The neutrality only involves allowing families to 
choose schools; there is no attempt to create neutrality in the public 
school itself or to eliminate compulsory education. 58 Keeping the gov-
ernment or political majority from intervening in family choice of 
schools prevents the essentially political process of school governance 
54 See M. KATZ, supra note 52; D. NASAW, supra note 52. 
55 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
56 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
57 John Coons, who has written his own brief for family choice, described this 
problem in referring to Thomas Jefferson's post mortem feelings: "Would he perhaps 
grieve that the First Amendment reads 'religion' instead of 'ideology'?" NONPUBLIC 
SCHOOL AID 48 (E. West ed. 1976). 
58 The elimination of compulsory schooling has been suggested, see, e.g., THE 
TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE (W. Richenbacker ed. 1974), but even this would leave the 
government in the position of conditioning the provision of a government benefit 
(tax-supported schooling) upon the sacrifice of first amendment rights. Cf. Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404 (1963). 
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from being overburdened by the often irreconcilable value preferences 
of parents.59 Thus, whenever a political majority establishes some set 
of values as central to a school, a dissenting family ought to be able to 
send its child to another more suitable school. Under such an arrange-
ment, schooling decisions do not have to be resolved by choosing one 
value over another or by creating an artificial compromise which 
respects neither value. On a personal level, this policy respects the 
dignity as well as the personal and cultural values of individuals. On a 
political level, this policy insures that no group or political majority 
can use school socialization to maintain or extend its ideology or 
political power. The democratic process of formulating public policy is 
thereby preserved. 
This entire argument might simply prove that a majoritarian 
school system is consistent with the tenets of political democracy and 
individual dignity as long as it provides that dissenting families may 
send their children to private schools. But as stated above, many, 
perhaps most, families are too poor to afford private schools. We have 
created a system of school finance that provides free choice for the rich 
and compulsory socialization for the poor and working class. The 
present method of financing and controlling American public school-
ing discriminates against the poor and working class, and even a large 
part of the middle class, by conditioning the exercise of first amend-
ment rights of school choice upon an ability to pay, while simultane-
ously eroding that ability to pay through the regressive collection of 
taxes used exclusively for public schools. 60 This arrangement seems 
S9 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943): 
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes 
more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our 
people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to 
choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall 
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to 
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort. . . . Compulsory 
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. 
60 The problem of choice is to be distinguished from the problem of per capita 
school expenditures that vary with the district tax base. The Supreme Court has held 
that this latter phenomenon does not lead to any constitutional violation. San Antonio 
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Several states have 
disagreed. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 
(1971), cerl. del/ied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. CahiII, 62 N.J. 473,303 
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no more defensible than denying a man the right to vote because he 
cannot afford the poll tax.61 
The present method of financing and controlling schooling in 
America is neither accidental nor immutable. We allow the majority to 
dictate what values school children will learn, and we do not question 
the collection of tax money from every citizen. Yet, we do not permit 
the dissenting family to have the benefit of those tax dollars. The 
family that wishes neither to have its children learn a set of values it 
finds abhorrent nor to suffer the conflict and alienation which result 
from competing efforts to control the child's learning must pay private 
school tuition as well as public school tax. In effect, we confront the 
dissenting family with a choice between giving up its basic values, as 
the price of gaining a "free" education in a government school, or 
paying twice in order to preserve its first amendment rights. 62 
Naturally the burden of forced choices between economic sur-
vival and the preservation of personal and cultural values falls most 
heavily upon the poor, the working class and those minorities that are 
overrepresented in that segment of society. Unresolvable, self-
consuming conflict or unnatural passivity in the face of education 
"experts" often results. And all the while, our present school ideol-
ogy tells these same poor and working class persons that the present 
structure of school is their best hope for an equal place in society. The 
result is that those who are least able to resist are systematically 
deprived of their ability to dissent in the molding of their children's 
minds. 
A change in government-created financing mechanisms can rec-
tify the abridgment of the poor's first amendment rights and equalize 
families' rights to choose schools. This would make real for the major-
ity of families what is now only a hollow constitutional right to avoid 
public education by using alternative schools. 
A.2d 273, modified, 63 N.J. 196,306 A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). In 
any case, the fundamental right to education rejected by the Court in Rodrigllez is not 
the same as the accepted fundamental first amendment rights that we argue imply 
school choice. 
61 See Harper V. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1976). 
62 This payment consists of tuition costs for "private" schooling added to prop-
erty, income and other taxes supporting "public" schooling. Note 66, infra, suggests 
that such a burden upon rights may be unconstitutional. 
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B. The First Amendment Inside the School: 
Conditioning Access to Education on 
Confessions of Belief 
Children whose families cannot exercise their constitutional right 
to obtain alternative education have no escape from the values of the 
public school they must attend. Despite the ringing words of Justice 
Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 63 
children who wish to succeed in school are forced to confess belief in 
the dominant school ideology. 64 
Value inculcation, however, is only one aspect of the challenge 
the public school systems present to first amendment guarantees. 
Those students who do not share the majoritarian values of the educa-
tional establishment may be denied access to the knowledge and skills 
necessary for them to participate in the political process. Alienation 
from the dominant value structure may generate disciplinary prob-
lems6s or cause poor performance on standardized tests. 66 In either 
case, educational doors will close. 
63 319 U.S. 524 (1943). 
64 The following personal recollection by Charles Lawrence is illustrative: 
In the fourth grade I was one of two blacks in my class. Each week we began 
the school assembly by singing Old Black Joe and The Caisson Song. 
Occasionally Carry Me Back to Old VirgillllY and the United States 
Marilles' SOllg were substituted. My father was a proud black man and a 
pacifist. He has studied and worked with \v'E.B. DuBois and had been a 
conscientious objector during World War II. He had taught me and my sisters 
to be proud to be Negroes and had forbidden us to watch Amos alld Alldy 
and other TV shows relying on black stereotypes. I recall feeling acutely 
embarrassed and ashamed as we sang these songs, but I sang along with my 
friends because they were enjoying it and I didn't want to be different. Were 
the ritualistic singings of songs that demeaned my race and glorified the 
military any less acts of confession than the flag salute in Barnette or the 
Bible reading in Schempp? 
I survived these destructive socializing rituals and many others like 
them because I was fortunate enough to have parents who encouraged me to 
express my feelings of rage and humiliation and who taught me how to fight 
in effective but socially acceptable ways. Most children are not so lucky. 
6S C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970). 
66 B. GALLAGHER, NAACP REpORT ON MINORITY TESTING (1976); Hilliard, 
Standardization alld Cultural Bias as lmpedime/lts to the Scielltijic Study and Valida-
tioll of "lmelligellce," 12 J. RESEARCH DEV. Eouc. 47 (Winter 1979). 
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To make effective schooling available to dissenting students only 
upon compromise of their first amendment freedoms violates the gen-
eral rule that government benefits may not be conditioned on surrender 
of constitutional rights. 67 More pointedly, to do so runs counter to the 
teaching of Barnette. In that case, the Court stated: 
The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the 
individual. The State asserts power to condition access to 
public education on making a prescribed sign and profession 
and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both 
parent and child. The latter stand on a right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and 
personal attitude. 68 
In its holding, the Court clearly rejected the state's asserted power to 
make education available only to those who would tolerate the school's 
invasion of "the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control. ' '69 
Just as the structure of public education subtly undermines the 
values of the minority, so it deprives the minority of access to educa-
tion. Thus, it threatens their first amendment right to participate in the 
political process. Educationally deprived students will be handicapped 
when they try to participate in that process. Widespread illiteracy, 
produced in part by conditioning education upon acceptance of !:lomi-
nant values, undermines the validity of that discourse because it pre-
vents increasing numbers of people from effectively voicing their 
beliefs. As discussed in subsection 4, this illiteracy is an example of 
society's failure to realize the values imbedded in the first amendment. 
67 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Pickeringv. Board of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This rule that the state may not accomplish indirectly 
what it is forbidden to do directly must be strictly adhered to when, as here, the benefit 
involved is arguably another constitutional right-the fourteenth amendment right to 
equal educational opportunity. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See gener-
ally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
68 319 U.S. at 603-3l. 
69 [d. at 642. 
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J. Disciplinary Action as a Form of Belief Coercion 
School discipline constitutes a form of value inculcation that is 
often overlooked. Children are usually disciplined for behavior that is 
antisocial in any cultural context. But often the disciplined behavior is 
merely the tip of the iceberg-the aimless striking out of a young 
person forced to accept a system of values that deny the student's 
humanity. 
In a case several years ago,70 a 16-year-old student was expelled 
from school, along with eight other black students, for participation in 
a race riot at their recently integrated high school. No white students 
were expelled. At first blush this seemed a typical due process case 
with equal protection overtones. But as the case unfolded, it became 
apparent that the disciplinary problems were a result of a clash in 
values between the formerly all-white, largely upper-middle-class 
school and the newly arrived poor black students. 
The student's school file described "a pleasant boy" who was 
"scrappy but well behaved" according to the teachers in the all-black 
grade schools and junior high he had attended. His attendance and 
grades at those schools were good. Neighbors knew the same boy. 
"Always helps his mama out and looks after his brothers and sister." 
"A well-mannered boy," they said. But at the white high school, he 
was suspended five times prior to his expulsion for acts such as refus-
ing to take off his hat, cutting classes and talking back to a teacher. He 
was described as "sullen," "lazy," "uncooperative" and "hostile" 
in teachers' reports to the administration. Finally, he was expelled for 
punching a white student during a disturbance involving over a hun-
dred students of both races. The teachers' union threatened to go on 
strike if he and the eight other black students who had been expelled 
were readmitted. When asked if he wanted to go back to school, the 
student shook his head "no." 
In order to remain in the good graces of their teachers, this student 
and his friends would have had to accept a set of attitudes and corre-
sponding behavioral requirements that would have restricted their 
70 Charles Lawrence acted as lawyer in this case. The material referred to h;re is 
drawn from his files. The experience of these students is not atypical. For similar 
cases, see Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp 1330 (N.D. Fla. 1973), affd sub nom. 
Sweet v. Childs, 507 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975). 
1980] First Amendment and Schooling 331 
development as full human beings and as effective participants in the 
body politic. The school demanded that they walk and talk and wear 
their clothes in a way that made their white teachers comfortable. They 
were expected to remain silent while teachers blamed their poor per-
formance on their lack of intelligence or the conditions of their homes 
and neighborhoods. In class, they were ignored or ridiculed because, 
unlike their upper-middle-class white classmates, they did not sound 
like their teachers when they spoke. When they cut class to avoid 
embarrassment, they were suspended. If they refused to assirnHate 
they were ostracized as misfits or patronized as underprivileged charity 
cases.1 1 
These young people responded to the school's hostile environ-
ment with an increased hostility that expressed itself in the kind of 
antisocial behavior that provided a rationale for their expUlsion from 
school. The requirement that the school's attitudes be accepted with" 
silent consent was no less a coercive ritualistic confession than a flag 
salute. It was no less a denial of these students' first amendment rights. 
They were being trained to be passive, docile, self-denying individ-
uals; the training restricted their first amendment rights of individual 
development and participation in the political process. If they resisted 
that training they were denied the right to remain in school, where the 
71 See generally CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND OF THE WASHINGTON REsEARCH 
PROJECT, CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA (1974); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE 
FUND OF THE WASHINGTON REsEARCH PROJECT, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS (1975); 
SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL AND THE ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL, STUDENT 
PuSHOUT (1973). These studies rely largely upon data collected by the Office of Civil 
Rights (0 CR) of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the fall of 1973. 
As part of its National School Survey of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 
OCR surveyed almost 3,000 school districts, accounting for over 50% of the total 
enrollment in American public schools and about 90% of all minority students. Brief 
for Children's Defense Fund of the Washington Research Project, Inc., and The 
American Friends Service Committee as Amici Curiae at 20, Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975). School districts were asked to reveal the total number of students 
suspended and expelled during the academic year, the cumulative number of suspen-
sion days out of school, and the racial and ethnic breakdowns of those figures. See 
generally P. JACKSON, LIFE IN CLASSROOMS (1968); H. KOHL, THIRTY-SIX CHILDREN 
(1967); S. LIGHTFOOT, WORLDS APART (1978); C. SILBERMAN, supra note 65, at 
113-57; T. Cottle, Dying a Different Sort oj Death: The Exclusion of Children from 
School, 83 SCHOOL REv. 145 (1974). 
332 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 15 
skills and knowledge necessary for the exercise of those same rights 
were available.72 
2. Testing and Ti'acking as Forms of Belief Coercion 
Each year thousands of black and latino children are judged by 
our schools to be mentally retarded because of low scores on standar-
dized I. Q. tests.73 Allan Bakke was found to be "better qualified" for 
admission to medical school than minority students who were admitted 
through a special admissions program, mainly because of his score on 
the Medical College Aptitude Test. 74 In South Carolina, California 
and other states, hundreds of black teachers, many of whom have been 
successful teachers, are being denied employment because of their 
scores on the National Teachers Examinations.75 Standardized testing, 
an integral part of our educational system, has a devastating impact on 
blacks and other minorities. 
72 See note 67, supra, which discusses the unconstitutionality of conditioning a 
government benefit (such as education) on surrender of a constitutional right (such as 
freedom of belief). 
13 B. GALLAGHER, supra note 66. 
14 See Brief of the Black Students Association at the University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law as Amicus Curiae at 2, 4, 16-18, Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), reprillted ill 2 ALLEN BAKKE VERSUS REGENTS 
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 502, 504, 516-18 (A. Slocum ed. 1978). 
15 See United States v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978), where in a 
one-sentence opinion, the Court affirmed a three-judge court finding, 445 F. Supp. 
1094 (D.S.C. 1977), that South Carolina test-score requirements for teacher 
certification and salary determination did not violate the fourteenth amendment prohi-
bition against purposeful racial discrimination, even though standards set in 1969 (a 
time of increasing federal pressure to desegregate South Carolina schools) had the 
foreseeable effect of eliminating 41% of black candidates, but only 1% of white 
candidates. 445 F. Supp. at 110 I, 1103 & n.9. Relying on Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976), the district court had determined that the required proof by plaintiff 
of the state's intent to create and use a racially discriminatory certification policy was 
not shown. 445 F. Supp. at 1100-07. Defendant's showing of similarity between test 
content and content of training programs fulfilled the Washingtoll v. Davis "rational 
relationship" requirement. [d. at 1112-16. 
White, joined by Brennan, dissented, pointing out that the "rational relation-
ship" standard requires proof of the test's relevance to job requirements, rather than its 
relevance to training programs. 434 U.S. at 1027. 
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Because standardized tests have had a discriminatory impact on 
minorities and have operated to deprive them of educational and 
employment opportunities,76 they have most often been attacked as a 
denial of the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the 
law.77 But the use of standardized testing undermines the first amend-
ment in an equally important way. While the most obvious form of bias 
in the standardized tests that permeate our educational system is the 
bias of language,78 there is often a cultural and ideological bias as 
well.19 Dr. Asa Hilliard has noted that "the only way that many 
76 McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 
FORDHAM L. REV. 651 (1979); White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive 
Invalidity: Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 89 (1979); 
Sorgen, supra note 44. 
77 Lewis, Certifying Functional Literacy: Competency Testing and Implications 
for Due Process and Equal Educational Opportunity, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979). Cf. 
P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306,1313 (N.D. Cal. 1972), ajfdpercuriam, 502 F.2d 
963 (9th Cir. 1974). 
However, in Waahington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court 
rejected an equal protection challenge to the civil service examination used to select 
police for the District of Columbia. Stating that a violation of the equal protection 
clause requires a showing of intentional discrimination, the Court held in effect that a 
state does not violate the equal protection clause by the use of a selection device that 
has a foreseeable discriminatory impact so long as racial discrimination was not the 
motivating factor. [d. at 239, 247-48. The holding is particularly anomalous in light 
of the Court's failure to recognize the causal relationship between D.C.'s de jure 
segregated school system, see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), 
affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and the poor 
performance of blacks on its civil service exam. 
78 See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 
1974). See generally Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
79 Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr., Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor 
School Dist., 473 F. Supp. 1371,1371-73 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (cultural differences in 
language impede learning). See White, supra note 76, at 100-02 (standardized tests 
poor predictors of performance); id. at 107-23 (cultural bias helps explain inaccu-
racy). Moreover, certain studies indicate that the vast majority of standardized tests 
employed by school systems are specifically biased against racial minorities and the 
poor. See P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (N.D. Cal. 1972), ajf'dpercuriam, 
502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974). These studies present only the tip of the iceberg, 
however; they do not consider the issue of cultural bias in the content of the tests. For a 
discussion of such bias, see Hilliard, supra note 66. In considering racial or class bias 
in standardized tests, educational psychologists have limited their inquiry to determin-
ing the presence of statistical bias or predictive validity. For example, the researcher 
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Europeans or European-Americans have been able to observe Africans 
or African-Americans has been as a perceived deviation from a Euro-
pean or European-American 'norm'. "so He refers to this form of 
assessment as the "Type I" question. It takes the form, "Do you 
know what I know?" Type I questions characterize almost all standar-
dized testing. A Type II question begins from an entirely different 
point, and takes the form, "What is it that you knoW?"SI 
The standardized Type I question is not only an inaccurate mea-
sure of the minority individual's intelligence or ability to learn, it is 
also a tool of belief coercion. In order to score well on the test, the test 
taker must "confess belief" in the values and world view of the 
tester.82 
The National Teachers Examinations, for example, affect the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of black children and tens of thousands 
of black teachers. It has already resulted in the denial of employment 
to many competent black teachers. 83 The Educational Testing Service, 
which designs and administers the NTE, has declared that the "pri-
mary function of the NTE is to provide objective, standardized mea-
sures of knowledge and skills developed in teacher training pro-
will ask whether the Law School Admissions Test predicts the perfonnance of blacks 
in their first year of law school with the same accuracy that it predicts that of whites. 
See White, supra note 76. Ironically, however, the researcher is measuring the bias of 
the test by evaluating its predictive ability in a scholastic setting that may itself be 
biased. The LSAT may be an accurate predictor of first-year grades in law school 
because it is designed to measure the applicant's ability to perfonn on first year law 
exams; yet, it has never been shown that the traditional law school curriculum and 
examination process either teaches or measures those qualities essential to good 
lawyering. For an excellent discussion of the history of the use of standardized tests as 
barriers to the legal profession, see White, The Definition of Legal Competence: Will 
the Circle be Unbroken? 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 641,662-74 (1978). 
80 Hilliard, Standardized Testing and African-Americans Building Assessor 
Competence in Systematic Assessment (Position paper presented to the National Insti-
tute for Community Development, National Task Force on Standardized Testing, 
August, 1978),6-7. 
81 Hilliard, Alternatives to I.Q. Testing: An Approach to the Identification of 
Gifted .. Minority" Children, Final report to the California State Department of 
Education (ERIC Clearinghouse on Early Childhood Education, Document No. 
147.009 (1976», 44. 
82 Id. at 44-60. 
83 See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (1977), affd, 434 
U.S. 1026 (1978). 
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grams." ETS expressly cautions that "[t]he information gained from 
the NTE is significant but limited .... [T]he NTE can properly be 
said to measure only a part, but a necessary part, of preparation for 
teaching. ' '84 
The claim by ETS that the NTE is an "objective, standardized" 
measure of teacher skills assumes that there is a standard curriculum 
for teacher preparation nationwide.8s No such curriculum exists. Nor 
has there been any attempt to demonstrate that it does.86 Moreover, to 
the extent that there is a common content to the curriculum of Ameri-
can education, it is a content permeated with European-American 
ethnocentrism. Again, Hilliard has pointed out that such a test must be 
biased against Afro- Americans as it is based on over four hundred 
years of academic bias in scholarship.87 
84 NTE POLICY COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR USING THE NATIONAL TEACHER 
EXAMINATIONS 1 (1979). 
85 Id. (the NTE "reflect curriculum areas and content common to most teacher 
education programs in the United States"). 
86 Indeed, the NTE Council encourages comments from educators "who have 
noted substantial discrepancies between the test content and the academic training 
expected of prospective teachers." Id. 
87 Hilliard, supra note 80, at 24: 
African-Americans have the right as citizens and the human right not to be 
required to become "expert achievers" in test content which may well be 
biased against African-Americans. For example, a test of general informa-
tion and history which failed to treat the activity of Toussaint L'Overture, 
Marcus Garvey, Edward Wilmont Blyden, Carter G. Woodson, Paul Robe-
son, Ira Aldredge, and others who have been heroic in the struggle for the 
liberation of African-Americans, would represent gross misinformation for 
African-American people. In reading the questions on the NTE, the College 
Boards, the Iowa Test of Educational Development, and other standardized 
tests of achievements, one would get the impression that African-Americans 
were non-existent and that the condition of slavery and other forms of 
oppression were unimportant for an educated person. Indeed, to be judged as 
a competent teacher by the NTE in South Carolina no less, or elsewhere, 
some African-Americans would have to commit cultural suicide. 
The implications of Hilliard's observations about the enthnocentrism of the NTE and 
other standardized tests go far beyond an argument for the exclusion of a few 
obviously biased history questions and the inclusion of a few items dealing with 
"black history." Social science scholarship has portrayed black family life and culture 
as pathological (see S. LIGHTFOOT, supra note 71, at 125-75). Curriculum in lan-
guage and literature ignores the literary contributions of blacks and characterizes their 
language as an undeveloped dialect-and therefore proof of their inferiority. 
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Increasingly the ability of individuals from minority subcultures 
to gain access to effective education in grade school and high school, 
not to mention admission to college, professional school or profes-
sional certification, depends upon their ability to succeed on examina-
tions that adopt the values of their oppressors. 88 Our educational sys-
For additional material on racial bias in education and scholarship, see L. 
CARLSON & G. COLBURN, IN THEIR PLACE (1972); A. CHASE, THE LEGACY OF 
MALTHUS (1977); T. GOSSETT, RACE (1973)) R. GUTHRIE, EVEN THE RAT' WAS 
WHITE (1976); J. HODGE, D. STRUCKMAN & L. FROST, CULTURAL BASES FOR RAc-
ISM AND GROUP OPPRESSION (1975); L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF I. Q. 
(1974); D. LACY, THE WHITE USE OF BLACKS IN AMERICA (1973); W. STANTON, THE 
LEOPARD'S SPOTS (1969); A. THOMAS & S. SILLEN, RACISM AND PSYCHIATRY (1972); 
The White Researcher ill Black Society (C. X (Clark) ed.), 29 J. Soc. ISSUES 1 
(1973). 
88 The opportunity to gain an education is frequently conditioned upon perform-
ance on standardized tests. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978); P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff d per curiam, 502 
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd 
sub 110111. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because standardized 
tests contain biases in favor of the world view of those who control our political and 
educational institutions, blacks and other oppressed Illinorities must sacrifice their own 
beliefs and confess to the majoritarian ideology if they wish continued access to the 
benefit of education. See gellerally Clauge, Competellcy Testillg alld PotellIiai COllsti-
tllliollai Chaliellges of" Everystudelll," 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 469 (1979). 
In January. 1977, the Maryland State Department of Education expressed an 
official philosophy of education in two ... policy statements [which] 
broaden the concept of minimum adult competence far beyond. mastery of 
"basic skills" ... and include . . . "citizenship", "survival skills"-
including "inter-personal skills" and "parenting" - and the "world of 
work". In the fall of 1977. a draft list of approximately 600 competencies 
was generated by advisory panels of professional educators and laypersons 
at the initiative of Maryland's Project Basic staff. Grouped and identified 
with each of the five human activity areas, the competencies expressed as 
"behaviors" were then winnowed down to 321 "possible prerequisites for 
graduation" .... Numerous items on the draft list probed the highly sensi-
tive areas of feeling and opinion, although none of these items may survive 
the next stages in the development of the state's competency tests. In late 
July of 1978, the Maryland Board of Education approved a "Declared 
Competency Index." ... Although many of the value-loaded items on the 
draft list distributed for public validation have or may be discarded, they 
nonetheless serve as useful illustrations of the kinds of competencies which, 
if transformed into mandatory test questions, may raise first and fourteenth 
amendment challenges. 
[d. at 472-73. 
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tern in general and the ubiquitous use of standardized tests in particular 
force those without power in .society either to accept the values of the 
powerful or to risk punishment for holding beliefs that are unaccept-
able to their oppressors but may well be essential to their own sur-
viva1.89 
3. Literacy, Value Inculcation and the Seeds of Revolution 
In today's society, literacy is a requirement for effectrve partidpa-
tion in the political process. But if our schools require that poor young 
.people adopt the beliefs and behavior of those who oppress them as a 
price for obtaining that skill, it should not be surprising that they reject 
the process and cling to their humanity. 
A 1975 Office of Education study indicated that 22 percent of 
Americans over 17 are illiterate and another 32 percent are only mar-
ginally literate.9o James Harris, past president of the National Educa-
tion Association, noted in 1975 that 23 percent of all school children 
fail to graduate from high school and that a large segment of those who 
do graduate are functionally illiterate.91 While the situation is dismal 
for all American school children, it is particularly bleak for minorities 
who are disproportionately represented in these illiteracy statistics. 
Persons of Spanish origin have an illiteracy rate more than twice that 
of the popUlation as a whole, and 85 percent of black students do not 
read as well as the average white student. In 1975, 87 percent of the 
elementary and junior high school students in Central Harlem failed 
their standardized tests in reading. 92 
89 Of course, to take an effective part in American politics and business, minority 
individuals need a command of standard English and basic mathematics as well as a 
grounding in economics and in political procedures. We do not suggest that these 
subjects, although largely the products of white culture, are so culturally biased that 
they should not be taught to minorities. We object here only to tests which, while 
purporting to be neutral, actually condition advancement on a profession of belief in 
the political, social and economic beliefs of the school administrators. 
90 N. HENTOFF, DoES ANYBODY GIVE A DAMN? 55 (1977). 
91 Id. at 55. "[A] person is functionally literate when he has acquired the 
knowledge and skills in reading and writing which enable him to engage effectively in 
aU those activities in which literacy is normally assumed in his culture or group." W. 
GRAY, THE TEACHING OF READING AND WRITING 24 (1956). 
92 N. HENTOFF, supra note 90, at 55-56; C. SMITH & L. FAY, GETTING PEOPLE 
TO READ (1973). While the standardized tests referred to here are not without cultural 
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The direct link between the literacy of our citizens and the vitality 
of our political system has been recognized since the nation's early 
years. 93 However, widespread illiteracy burdens the political process 
in today's technologically sophisticated world more severely than it did 
in the fledgling agrarian democracy Washington knew. When political 
debate occurred in barbershops, on street corners and in town meet-
ings, the man who could not read or understand the fluctuations bfthe 
international money market was not at a substantial disadvantage. But 
today the barbershop debate hardly constitutes the mainstream of the 
decisionmaking process. 
Functional illiteracy is usually defined by reference to an 
individual's ability to read instructions, fill out forms and perform 
other everyday reading and writing tasks which are vital to one's 
independence and well being. 94 In first amendment terms, however, an 
individual is functionally illiterate if he does not have the skills nec~s­
sary to understand what is happening in the political system and to 
participate effectively in that system by voicing his views. If illiteracy 
were measured as a function of one's ability to participate in the 
political process, it would be apparent that the problem is even graver 
than has been imagined. 
This recognition of the effect of illiteracy on the process that the 
first amendment is designed to protect is important. Without the skills 
necessary to gather information or communicate one's ideas and 
beliefs, an individual is denied even minimal participation in the politi-
cal debate. There is another way, however, in which widespread iIIiter-
acy acts to hinder the free flow of ideas. Those who are unable to 
participate in the governing process because of their inability to recog-
nize or articulate their self-interests or the nature of their oppression 
become dehumanized. When individuals are deprived of all control 
bias, the fact that they claim to measure achievement (Le., how well has a child 
learned to read standard English) rather than aptitude (does a child have sufficient 
intelligence to learn to read?) makes them somewhat less problematic. 
93 For example, George Washington urged in his Farewell Address: "Promote 
then as an object of primary importance, Institutions for the general diffusion of 
knowledge. In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, 
it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened." 35 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 230 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). 
94 See note 91 supra. 
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over their own destiny and are treated by the rest of society as objects, 
they come to believe they are less than human and therefore unworthy 
of participating in the political process.95 
Educators will surely respond that they are not responsible for 
these first amendment deprivations. After all, they have offered these 
young people an opportunity to read; it is not their fault that their offers 
have been rejected. But, as has been argued, that offer was made with 
substantial conditions impossible for these young people to accept. 
Typically, the teachers of ghetto minority children who refuse to learn 
believe that the children's world is dirty, ignorant and immoral; the 
teachers accept a view of the world that says that these children and 
those they love are at fault. The school's value system labels the 
children's fathers as lazy deserters, their mothers as immoral whores 
and their older brothers and sisters as criminals. Those who profess to 
educate them accept no responsibility for their condition other than to 
ask them to reject it. 96 
95 An analogy may be drawn between the situation of contemporary ghetto youth 
and that of slaves in states where it was forbidden to teach slaves to read or write. The 
master who forbade his slaves to learn to read did so to inhibit their ability to com-
municate. But he also sought to dehumanize the slave by denying him information 
about the world around him and by limiting his ability to control that world. See L. 
BENNETT, BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER 129 (1966); F. DOUGLAS, LIFE AND TIMES OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 76 (1892); L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 198 
(1978); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 13 (1975). Today, oppressed illiterates are heav-
ily concentrated in our urban ghettos and their condition can be likened to that which 
Freire has termed the "culture of silence." P. FREIRE, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
96 See note 67 supra. The following excerpts from Herbert Kohl's THIRTY-SIX 
CHILDREN, and Charles Silberman's CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM, are buttwo examples 
of a story that is told hundreds of times in these studies cited above. 
After a while the word "animal" came to epitomize for me most teachers' 
ambiguous relations to ghetto children-the scorn and the fear, the condes-
cension yet the acknowledgment of some imagined power and unpredictabil-
ity, I recognized some of that in myself, but never reached the sad point of 
denying my fear and uncertainty by projecting fearsome and unpredictable 
characteristics on the children and using them in class as some last primitive 
weapon. It was pitiful yet disgusting, all the talk of "them," "these chil-
dren," "animals." I remember a teacher from another school I taught in, a 
white Southerner with good intentions and subtle and unacknowledged pre-
judices. He fought for the good part of a semester to gain the children's 
attention and affection. He wanted the children to listen to him, to respond to 
him, to learn from him: yet never thought to listen, respond, or learn from 
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These young people who refuse to learn to read provide us with 
the most basic understanding of the conflict between our present modes 
of schooling and the command of the first amendment. When alien 
values are imposed upon an individual, that individual gives up his 
identity. He is required to abandon that which is most crucial to his 
sense of selfhood: his own unique view of the world around him. The 
purpose of the first amendment is to protect the individual from 
government-imposed uniformity, but only when each person is free to 
bring his own view of the world to the self-governing process is the 
vitality of that process protected. 
The application of a first amendment protection to the develop- , 
ment of belief inside schools indicates that it is not only in the absence 
of parental choice that families, especially minority families, suffer 
manipulation of their children's consciousness. Practices such as stan-
dardized testing, and policies that fail to recognize and respect cultural 
differences in the name of discipline or literacy all contribute to a 
broad denial of first amendment freedoms for children and families. In 
the children, who remained unresponsive, even sullen. They refused to 
learn, laughed at his professed good intentions, and tested him beyond his 
endurance. One day in rage and vexation it all came out. 
"Animals, that's what you are, animals, wild animals, that's all you are 
or can be." 
His pupils were relieved to hear it at last, their suspicions confirmed. 
They rose in calm unison and slowly circled the raging trapped teacher, 
chanting, "We are animals, we are animals, we are animals .... " until the 
bell rang and mercifully broke the spell. The children ran off, leaving the 
broken, confused man wondering what he'd done, convinced that he had 
always been of goodwill but that "they" just couldn't be reached. 
H. KOHL, THIRTY-SIX CHILDREN 187-88 (1967). 
ITEM: A sixth-grade class in a racially mixed school. A black girl calls out 
the answer to a question the teacher had asked of the entire class. "Don't 
you call out," the teacher responds. "You sit where I put you and be quiet," 
A few minutes later, when a blond-haired, blue-eyed girl calls out an answer 
to another question, the teacher responds, "Very good, Annette; that's good 
thinking.' , 
ITEM: A fifth-grade class in a racially-mixed school. A black youngster has 
his hand raised to ask a question; before the teacher can respond, the princi-
pal, who is visiting, tells the child, "Put your dirty hand down and stop 
bothering the teacher with questions." 
C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 92 (1970). 
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considering proposed mechanisms for restoring first amendment lib-
erty to American education, it is essential to recognize all the means 
by which first amendment rights have been and could continue to be 
denied. The provision of parental choice alone would still leave prac-
tices such as standardized testing as forceful denials of first amendment 
liberties. 
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: 
RECONCILING LIBERTY AND RACIAL EQUALITY 
This article has focused upon an understanding of the first amend-
ment as a protector of individual consciousness and upon the applica-
tion of this understanding to schooling in America. We have sought to 
demonstrate ways in which the structure and ideological orientation of 
our school system constitute a massive infringement of the first amend-
ment; but we have neither analyzed nor advocated any particular solu-
tion to this problem. We have avoided "utilitarianism" in part because 
we fear that the attempt to identify and discuss the basic first amend-
ment problems of schooling might be lost in an attack upon any pro-
posed solution. 
Throughout our discussion of value transmission and cultural 
conflict in schooling, our underlying concern has been with the power 
of individuals and families over the formation of belief and with the 
unfettered access of these persons to the political debate protected by 
the first amendment. Whenever the problems of power and political 
access are raised in the context of schooling, the question of racism 
must also be addressed. History, law and politics impose this dilemma 
upon us. Because there are in fact several conceivable solutions to first 
amendment problems in schooling, and because these solutions would 
all have effects on racism, we have chosen to examine directly the 
implications of our first amendment concerns for racial equality. There 
are two broad groups of remedies that could lessen the infringement of 
first amendment rights by schools: 1) those remedies that provide 
families with increased choice97 among schools and therefore imply a 
conflict between family choice and racial equality, and 2) those reme-
97 The term "family choice" and much of the thinking behind it belong to John 
Coons and Stephen Sugarman. See J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY 
CHOICE (1978). 
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dies that reduce the imposition of values within schools and therefore 
imply that liberty and racial equality are not in conflict. Our discussion 
of these two groups of remedies will not be exhaustive of first amend-
ment problems in a government-run school system. Our purpose is to 
suggest the thinking necessary to reconcile educational liberty and 
racial equality once the importance of these two principles has been 
recognized. 
A. Where Educational Choice and 
Racial Equality Conflict 
A number of plans have been suggested or are conceivable98 that 
might substantially increase the ability of all families to choose their 
children's schools without suffering additional school tax or tuition 
burdens. Under these plans the choice exercised by families would 
remove or substantially lessen the coercive socialization of children 
with values not in harmony with those of the family. The question is 
whether such plans can be compatible with racial equality in school-
ing. 99 
98 See id. at 190-211. See also The Center for the Study of Public Policy, 
EDUCATION VOUCHERS (1970). In 1976, there was an unsuccessful attempt to amend 
Michigan's constitution to create a voucher system. In 1980, an unsuccessful effort 
was made to place on the California ballot a proposition that would have made a 
similar change in their state's constitution. The California proposition would have 
created a system of state tuition tax credits of up to $1200/child. Such credits would 
permit corporations, unions and wealthy individuals to receive tax credits for contribu-
tions to schools willing to enroll students from poorer families, thus making it possible 
for those families to lose control of the education of their own children. 
99 There are of course other serious questions about the desirability of family 
choice plans even when they are seen as vindicating first amendment rights by 
minimizing government-sponsored manipulation of consciousness in schools. These 
questions fall into six broad categories: (1) religious domination-the fear that family 
choice in schooling is simply a cover for attempts by the major organized religions 
such as the Catholic Church to gain control of large parts of the public treasury; (2) 
civil liberties-the fear that those most likely to take advantage of a right of school 
choice are those least likely to support civil liberties and most likely to seek to spread 
intolerance; (3) need for social cohesion-the belief that public schools attended by 
almost all children and controlled by the majority provide one of America's only 
forums for creating a cohesive society able to define and meet national goals; (4) 
balkanization-the fear that if all families and subgroups can pursue their own values, 
the society will become hopelessly fragmented, probably on the basis of class, eco-
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Although we have suggested that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments are twin guardians of the political process, 100 history indicates 
that these two broad principles of constitutional order may be at odds 
where racial equality is concerned. When choice among schools is the 
issue, the first and fourteenth amendments may appear to be in direct 
and irreconcilable conflict. Such a conflict was suggested during the 
early resistance to school desegregation when the claim was made that 
rights of free association were as important as the rights to equal 
educational opportunities and an end to segregated schooling. to1 The 
history of the attempt to create racially equitable schooling supplies 
more evidence than necessary to prove that schemes for free choice in 
schooling can easily become methods for preserving forced segrega-
tion, denying equal educational resources and stigmatizing minori-
ties. 102 White privilege has often come at black expense in the sorry 
history of the races in America. 
1 . Overview of Racism and 
Family Choice Since 1954 
After the Supreme Court declared school segregation unconstitu-
tional in 1954, some school districts resisted eliminating racism by 
adopting tuition vouchers or grant-in-aid plans that effectively pre-
served white-only schools. In 1967, the Louisiana legislature, stating 
nomic status, religion and political persuasion, as well as race; (5) expertise-the 
belief that only education experts have the knowledge and ability to create a good 
education and that more parental control will undermine the objective quality of 
education; and (6) technocracy-the belief that the technocratic and inequitable values 
often found in public school bureaucracies are so pervasive in other American institu-
tions such as television and school-text industries that a family may not be able to 
increase noticeably its influence over child-rearing through school choice. 
Each of these problems deserves serious consideration and analysis, analysis 
which will only be forthcoming after recognition of the threat to the first amendment 
posed by economic discrimination in availability of school choice. But because the 
"color line" continues to be America's most fundamental dilemma, the problem of 
racism and liberty in schooling commands the greatest attention in this article. 
100 See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra. 
101 See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890,898 (6th Cir. 1972) (Weick, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973). See also Wechsler, Toward Neu-
tral Principles oj Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). 
102 See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra. 
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that it was "mindful that the parent, not the State of Louisiana, shall 
be the determining force which shall decide on the type of education 
ultimately received by the child," declared that it was "the policy of 
this state to provide financial aid scholarships to needy children 
enrolled in private non-sectarian schools ... in [the] state whose 
parents choose not to enroll said children in the public education facili-
ties. " 103 This statute and an earlier one, 104 both of which had provided 
tuition expenses to all children attending state-approved private 
schools, were invalidated in Poindexter v. Louisiana. 105 Holding that 
both the effects and the purposes of the laws were impermissible, the 
court said that "[t]he inevitable" effect of the tuition grants was the 
establishment and maintenance of a state supported system of segrega-
ted schools for white children, making the state a party to organized 
private discrimination.' '106 
In an even more blatant attempt to circumvent an order of the 
federal courts, Prince Edward County in Virginia eliminated its public 
schools altogether and provided "scholarships" for those children 
attending the white academies in the county. The plan was ruled illegal 
after several years,107 but not before it had contributed to the notion 
that parental choice is synonymous with racial discrimination. 
Even without using tuition or scholarship aid, states and school 
districts have attempted to preserve discriminatory patterns in school-
ing by appealing to the notion of free choice and the natural desire of 
parents to have significant influence over the education of their chil-
dren. In 1968, the Supreme Court's ruling in Green v. County School 
Board108 made it clear that while "freedom of choice" plans might 
not be unconstitutional in and of themselves, they are unacceptable so 
long as there are other methods which promise "speedier and more 
effective conversion to a unitary nonracial school system." 109 The 
existence of racially identifiable schools in a school district may be 
103 1967 La. Acts No. 99, §2. 
104 1962 La. Acts No. 147. 
lOS Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 
(B.D. La. 1967), ajfdperclIriam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). 
106 [d. at 845. 
107 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
108 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
109 [d. at 441. 
1980] First Amendment and Schooling 345 
cited as evidence of invidious discrimination in school policy. Parental 
choice may also lead to racially identifiable schools; and free choice 
and racial equality become antagonists. I to 
The history of the relationship of racism and parental choice does 
not encourage the view that the first and fourteenth amendment princi-
ples are compatible where school choice is the issue. But, imagine that 
the public, and especially poor and working-class minorities, were to 
realize the importance of eliminating economic discrimination in first 
amendment schooling rights, and were to demand a system in which 
every parent had an equal ability to choose his child's school. Would 
the result simply be a return to racism in schools? Can racist choices be 
prohibited while preserving the general operation of parental liberty in 
school choice? 
In another society and at another time it might not be necessary to 
single out some family choices for prohibition; but, as American his-
tory demonstrates, whites have so persistently and systematically vic-
timized blacks that we must resist the accumulated and institutiona-
lized racism of the past by erecting specific safeguards and by taking 
remedial actions in the present. And so we must ask whether the 
existing legal and political protections against racism would be strong 
and reliable enough to prevent clashes between family choice and 
racial equality. 
110 Some persons have not only opposed systems which pennit "black" or 
"white" schools, but have also favored integration as the only justifiable expression of 
racial equality in schools. It is possible, however, that the fonnulation of schooling 
issues in such absolute categories ignores reality. Opposition to freedom of choice for 
all families may in part be fabricated by a disingenuous appeal to racial equality, just as 
support for some tuition voucher plans has been fabricated in part by a disingenuous 
appeal to parental liberty. Racially identifiable schools are not necessarily providing 
poor education or promoting racism, and integrated schooling may in some instances 
be a violation of the rights of equal education of minority families. See Moss v. 
Stanford Bd. of Educ., 350 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1972) (integration plan may not 
place disproportionate burden on black students). The fact that a minority family may 
choose a racially identifiable school, thereby perpetuating the school's identifiability, 
does not mean that the education provided there is inferior or that the family has been 
denied its rights under the fourteenth amendment. The education of children within a 
culturally supportive atmosphere may be an important quality, both to the child's 
education and to the family's and subgroup's ability to preserve its unique heritage and 
values. In fact, a blind pursuit of racial integration, without attention to the values and 
desires of minority parents, may be as offensive a fonn of racism as coercive separa-
tion and stigmatization of minority parents. 
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2. Existing Protections Against Racism 
There are three basic protections against racial discrimination in 
school admissions and the distribution of school benefits. First, the 
fourteenth amendment prohibits such discriminatory practices wher-
ever it can be shown that the government is intentionally involved in 
perpetuating or condoning such practices. To the extent that school tax 
funds are used at nongovernment schools pursuant to family choice, 
sufficient state action could be found to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion.'" Relying on private parties to ferret out and file suit against 
discriminatory admissions or distribution of benefits, however, may 
not be the most effective way of eliminating such practices, especially 
considering the cost, in time and money, of litigation. 
A second source of protection against discrimination lies in fed-
erallegislation, especially Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,112 
which provides that no organization shall discriminate on the basis of 
race, among other grounds, in the distribution of federal benefits. 
Insofar as private schools chosen by families receive federal funds, 
Title VI would apply. Federal aid to private schools is not substantial, 
however, and few schools might actually be covered; and the same 
problems of private enforcement make Title VI weaker than it might 
appear. 
Finally, as a third source of protection, there is the denial of 
nonprofit tax status to discriminatory schools by the Internal Revenue 
III See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1973) (Constitution pro-
hibits a state from "giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other 
invidious discrimination"). It is possible, of course, that under a voucher plan the 
presence of tax dollars (through voucher reimbursement) in independent schools would 
create sufficient state action to make the fourteenth amendment applicable on issues of 
race. At the same time, proponents of including religious schools in the voucher plan 
would undoubtedly argue that the intervening family choice of which school is 
attended and thereby funded and the applicability of vouchers to all schools would 
eliminate the threat of a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 
In this way the proponents of family choice and the proponents of racial equality would 
be put at doctrinal odds even if they shared objective interests. It is a problem that asks 
for a doctrine capable of harmonizing the establishment and equal protection clauses 
through adoption of a more flexible and realistic view of state action. See note 1, 
supra. 
11242 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976). 
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Service. A recent attempt by the IRS to promulgate rules 113 that would 
make the enforcement of nondiscrimination requirements through 
denial of tax exempt status more effective has been stalled through 
vigorous resistance by much of the private school sector. 114 
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that 
the first amendment requires the government to assume a neutral 
stance vis-a-vis privately initiated racial discrimination. l1S In Nor-
wood v . Harrison, 116 the Court held unconstitutional a Mississippi 
program in which textbooks were purchased by the state and loaned to 
students in both public and private schools, including private schools 
with racially discriminatory policies. Chief Justice Burger noted: 
although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it 
places no value on discrimination as it does on the values 
inherent in the Free Exercise Clause. Invidious private dis-
crimination may be characterized as a form of exercising 
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, 
but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional pro-
tections. 117 
113 Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 
9451 (1979). The proposal provided elaborate criteria for determining whether a 
school is "a reviewable school," i.e., one created or expanded as a result of public 
school desegregation and having a small number of minority students. "Reviewable 
schools" and "adjudicated schools" (those found by a court or agency to engage in 
discrimination) would lose tax-exempt status unless they took affirmative remedial 
efforts. [d. at 9454. See also Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A 
Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations. 79 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1514, 1527-33 (1979). 
\\4 Congress voted to postpone the enforcement of these regulations for at least a 
year from September 6, 1979. The vote followed an earlier decision to cut off funds 
for the efforts by the Internal Revenue Service to end the tax-exemption for dis-
criminatory schools. See Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appro-
priation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103,93 Stat. 559 (1979). 
115 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-79 (1976); Norwood v. Harri-
son, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
116 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
\\7 [d. at 470. The Court explained that the Constitution allows much less aid to 
segregated schools than to sectarian schools. The constitutional value of the free 
exercise clause acts as a balance for the establishment clause and permits some aid to 
religious schools. But since the Constitution "places no value on discrimination ... , 
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B. Teaching Racism 
The most difficult aspect of the conflict between first and four-
teenth amendment principles arises from the teaching of racist doctrine 
or values in schools operating under a parental choice system. It might 
be expected that under a family choice plan, children would attend any 
school voluntarily and that families would have an increased and more 
intimate influence on the values taught at the children's schools. But 
even if some families have the time and energy to exercise this 
influence, others may, through ignorance, convenience or ideological 
compatibility, select schools that foster racism. Thus, the government, 
by subsidizing the right of family choice, will in effect subsidize racist 
teaching. These schools may avoid detection because the victims of 
their ideology do not attend their schools and do not directly confront 
the human reality of their twisted thinking. In such a circumstance, a 
minority group loses any semblance of control or even influence over 
an ideology that directly victimizes it. For, even if minority children 
do not attend a particular school, a stigma, generated through the 
teaching of racism, attaches to its victims; more fuel is added to a fire 
that burns only a minority of the population. 
If a school taught a set of attitudes or values other than racist 
ones-for example, if it taught collective rather than competitive liv-
ing, or exploratory rather than authoritarian learning-an enlightened 
public would not be moved to intervene. Certainly, the concept of 
individual rights of freedom of expression and belief articulated in the 
first part of this essay argues against any such intervention by the 
majority. Each person and group has a right both to hold and to teach 
whatever values it pleases. 
The first amendment tells us that no matter how odious a majority 
may find the existence or expression of an idea to be, no matter how 
corrupt or twisted that idea may seem, its expression cannot be 
suppressed. Such ideas may be argued against, exposed or ridiculed, 
the channel of permissible state aid to sectarian schools ... permits a greater degree of 
state assistance than may be given to private schools which engage in discriminatory 
practices that would be unlawful in a public school system." Id. at 469- 70. A district 
court has suggested that although tax exemptions for religious institutions are constitu-
tional, similar exemptions for religiously sponsored segregation academies would be 
unconstitutional. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-70 (D. D. C.), aff d 
memo sub 110111. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
1980] First Amendment and Schooling 349 
but the power of the state may not be used to suppress them. But 
where, as with government-subsidized racism, the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments clash with the first amendment, this absolute posi-
tion needs reexamination. 
In Runyon v. McCrary,118 a case holding that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866119 prohibits private, nonsectarian schools from denying 
admission to blacks, the Court indicated that its earlier holding in 
Norwood had not raised the question of whether the first amendment 
protected the teaching of racially discriminat0ry subject matter or 
values in private schools. 120 But the reasoning in Norwood, Poindex-
ter and other cases extending the equal educational opportunity princi-
ple of Brown v. Board of Education 121 to private schools receiving 
government support would seem to require the same result where, 
although admissions procedures are nondiscriminatory, the curriculum 
remains racist. 
The advocacy of white supremacy in a school subject to the 
mandate of Brown constitutes speech inseparable from forbidden con-
duct. Such advocacy is not simply expression; it is teaching and urging 
that, being acts of racism in themselves, pose the clear and present 
danger of creating the stigmatization forbidden by the thirteenth and 
fourteenth amendments. 122 If a discriminatory admissions policy vio-
lates Brown because segregation stigmatizes the black child and 
118 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
1\942 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). 
120 "It is clear that the present application of § 1981 infringes no parental right 
recognized in Meyer, Pierce, Yoder or Norwood . .. Nor do these cases involve a 
challenge to the subject matter which is taught in any private school. Thus, the 
[schools] remain presumptively free to inculcate whatever values and standards they 
deem desirable. Meyer and its progeny entitle them to no more." Id. at 177. 
121 347 U.S. 485 (1954). 
122 The advocacy of racial supremacy in state supported schools is distinguish-
able from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), where the court found such 
advocacy protected by the first amendment, in two regards: 1) In Brandellburg, there 
was an absence of government involvement with the speaker, eliminating the argument 
that the state had an independent interest in avoiding its own involvement in discrimi-
nation; 2) in Brandenburg, the clear-and-present-danger test was not met because the 
danger or unlawful act (violence against blacks and Jews) was not sufficiently proxi-
mate. However, the same words spoken in a school would accomplish the harm 
(stigmatizing blacks) as soon as they were uttered. 
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thereby denies him an equal educational opportunity,123 then clearly a 
school that imposes the stigma more directly by teaching its students 
that blacks are inferior likewise violates the equal protection clause. 124 
And, of course, the teaching of racially discriminatory values will 
have the obvious and foreseeable effect of deterring attendance by 
black children. 125 Such transparently coercive "free choice" has been 
firmly rejected by the Court. 126 
123 347 U.S. at 494. 
124 See Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affd per 
curiam, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court upheld the discharge of 
public school teachers who sent their own children to a private segregated academy, 
despite their argument that their right to freedom of association was thereby infringed. 
The trial court stated that "students in desegregated classes are likely to perceive 
rejection, and experience a sense of inferiority, from a teacher whose own children 
attend a nearby racially segregated school, and be inclined to perform at a lower 
educational leveL" [d. at 860. See also Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 
316 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1970), aff d per curiam, 448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971), 
in which the court ordered the removal of the Confederate battle flag from a school 
principal's office on the grounds that it had "become a symbol of resistance to school 
integration and, to some, a symbol of white racism in general" and was "not constitu-
tionally permissible in a unitary school system where both white and black students 
attend school together." [d. at 1176. 
125 Cf. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,464 (1979) (in equal 
protection challenges to allegedly segregative policy of school board, "actions having 
foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ulti-
mate fact, forbidden purpose"). Accord, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 
526,537 n.9 (1979). 
Such teaching of racist subject matter and values is distinguishable from the 
situation in Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973), in which a state univer-
sity was enjoined from coercing its student newspaper which had published prosegre-
gation editorials. The court held that the student editors' first amendment rights had 
been infringed by the cut off of university funds, although the equal protection clause 
would have required a funding cut off if the newspaper had segregated its staff. Since 
the staff was not shown to be segregated and since the editorials did not actively 
obstruct the efforts to desegregate the university, the university could not interfere. Id. 
at 463. Thus, propagating racism appears to be unconstitutional only if it leads to 
segregation. This principle also distinguishes the case of a professor at a state univer-
sity who begins to teach racism. Since one man's opinions are not likely to promote the 
segregation of an entire university, the fourteenth amendment would not require cut-
ting off his salary and the first amendment would very likely forbid it. See Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
126 See Green v. New Kent County Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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An alternative approach might be used when considering the 
constitutionality of government regulation of the teaching of racism. If 
the government's purpose is seen not as suppression of racist speech 
but as furthering the constitutionally compelled goal of avoiding state-
sponsored stigmatization of blacks or segregation, then the regulation 
may be characterized as one that places an incidental burden on 
speech.127 The ban on racist expression in schools would be a side 
effect of achieving the thirteenth and fourteenth amendment goals of 
removing the stigma and achieving full citizenship for blacks. Such a 
ban would not constitute an effort to suppress racist ideas per se but 
would only involve their restriction in those places, such as schools, 
where the government deems it necessary to achieve nonspeech related 
goals. 128 
127 Whenever possible the Court has avoided being placed in the position of 
having to rank competing constitutional values. Most often it has done so by using the 
state action doctrine. By finding sufficient state involvement in the actions of private 
parties, the Court attributes those actions to the state, and thereby avoids the need to 
weigh the privacy, associational or free speech rights of some individuals against the 
speech or equality rights of others. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 
(1973); Reitman v. Mulkey, 378 U.S. 369 (1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 
255-60 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); 
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 
(1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Bllt see Bell v. 
Maryland, 378 U.S. at 312-15 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (favoring equality over 
associational rights after explicitly weighing the two). 
In these cases and in those in which no state action claim was involved, see, e.g., 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409 (1968), the results have favored the value of equality. Even though the Court 
upheld private discrimination by finding no state action in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
Irvis, 401 U.S. 163 (1972), the alleged privacy and associational rights of the club 
members did not prevail in the face of a state public accommodations statute outlawing 
discriminatory practices. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order 
of Moose Lodge 107,448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 
(1972). 
128Laurence Tribe has argued that government "abridgments" of expression fall 
into two categories and that the Supreme Court has developed a distinct method of 
analysis for each. 
First, government can aim at ideas or information, in the sense of singling 
out actions for government control or penalty, either (a) because of the 
specific viewpoint such actions express or (b) because of the effects pro-
duced by awareness of the information such actions impart .... Second, 
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Here the government interests are extremely weighty. The same 
Constitution which, it has been argued, insures an economically equi-
table right of family choice in schooling also forbids stigmatization and 
the denial of rights and benefits on the basis of race. The thirteenth, 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments express the constitutional com-
mitment that whatever choices individuals, families or groups may be 
entitled to make, they are not entitled to inflict racist conditions upon 
others. Certainly the preservation of racism is not among the rights 
secured by the first amendment. Moreover, government restriction of 
racist speech would be far from total, as private citizens would still be 
free to express racist ideas outside of the schools. 
Finally, while the Court has generally condemned discrimination 
among ideas as forbidden censorship,129 it has also valued some 
speech more highly than other speech and therefore protected it more 
scrupulously.130 Thus, while libel, pornography and commercial 
without aiming at ideas or information in either of the above senses, govern-
ment can restrict the flow of information and ideas while pursuing other 
goals, either (a) by limiting an activity through which information and ideas 
might be conveyed or (b) enforcing rules compliance with which might 
discourage the communication of ideas or information. 
L. TRIDE, supra note 1, at 580. 
129 See Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,99 (1972) 
(ordinance may not distinguish between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful 
picketing). 
l30See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding "obscenity" 
unprotected by the first amendment); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,256-57 
(1952) (denying protection to "libellous ... utterances"); Valentine v. Christensen, 
316 U.S. 52,54 (1942) (refusing to enjoin suppression of "commercial" speech); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572(1942) (holding "fighting words" 
unprotected) . 
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court 
upheld a zoning ordinance regulating the location of theatres displaying sexually 
explicit "adult" movies. In so doing, Justice Stevens' plurality opinion admitted that 
the ordinance regulated nonobscene speech that was protected by the first amendment, 
but found justification for this content-based regulation by arguing in part that sexually 
explicit expression has "lesser" value than other protected speech and thus does not 
demand full government neutrality. "[I]t is manifest that society'S interest in protect-
ing this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the 
interest in untrammeled political debate .... " 427 U.S. at 70. Justice Stevens also 
stated that "[e]ven though the First Amendment protects communication in this area 
from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these 
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speech are not excluded from the first amendment's protection, their 
regulation appears to be more easily justified than that of speech that is 
more highly valued. The commitment to racial equality articulated in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments necessarily implies that rac-
ist speech is of little value to the political system that the first amend-
ment seeks to protect. Like pornography and libel, it should be given 
less weight when placed in the balance against competing societal 
interests. 131 When all these factors are considered, there seems little 
doubt that the balance should swing in the direction of the 
government's protection of equality. 
C. Where Education, Liberty and Racial 
Equality are not in Conflict 
The second broad category of school reforms that might vindicate 
first amendment rights calls for reducing the imposition of values 
within schools rather than increasing choice among schools. Here, the 
target becomes any mechanism that aids the powerful in imposing 
beliefs, attitudes or ideologies upon the powerless. 
These reforms assume that most children will continue to go to 
public schools. They are based on the premise that even incomplete 
remedies that move in the direction of increasing respect for first 
amendment freedom of consciousness are important. Although these 
partial remedies may not provide the comprehensive protection for 
minority values that equal choice of schooling promises, they do have 
the benefit of advancing racial equality along with parental liberty. 
This is so because the failure to respect the culture and values of the 
minority student will lead to consequences that are condemned by both 
the first amendment and the fourteenth amendment. Racism and the 
repression of parental liberty are two sides of the same coin to many 
materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion 
pictures." [d. at 70-71. By this rationale, racist speech could be accorded less 
protection then nonracist utterances, see note 131 infra, especially in the context of a 
state-subsidized school, see note 127 supra. 
131 It might well be argued that the devaluation of speech advocating white 
supremacy is more easily justifiable than the Court's questionable treatment of sex-
ually explicit speech in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, which 
finds no textual support in the Constitution. 
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families; and minority families are a disproportionate share of the 
victims of the imposition of consciousness in government schools. 
Three possible remedies aimed at the mechanisms of imposing 
belief within schools are: 1) the abolition of standardized testing, 2) the 
creation of decentralized community control of schools and 3) the 
retraining of teachers concerning the imposition of values. 
I. Abolition of Standardized Testing 
The discussion in Part III made clear the need to abolish standar-
dized testing as a means for determining access to knowledge and 
power. Just as there is no such thing as a value-neutral education, there 
is no such thing as a value-neutral test. 132 Forward-looking educa-
tional psychologists have already begun to devise nonstandardized 
methods of evaluation, diagnosis and prognosis that will provide edu-
cators with the information they need to determine how best to teach 
their students. 133 Job-related measures of performance should replace 
tests like the NTE. When classification devices are laden with values 
unrelated to one's ability to acquire knowledge or perform the job in 
question, they impinge upon rights protected by the first amendment 
and should be abandoned. 
2. Community Control of Schools 
The community control movement saw its peak in the late sixties. 
Black parents realized that a school was not likely to be responsive to 
their wishes nor to serve the needs of their children unless they had a 
voice in its hiring, firing and educational policy. 
The struggle by minority communities for control of the schools 
was certainly important as a first step toward a more generalized shift 
in the power relationships of the ghetto. But perhaps a more significant 
aspect of control of education was the concomitant control of the 
vehicle that transmits ideas and values, so that instead children may 
view the world from their own perspec,tive. 134 
132 Cattell, Are Culture Fair Intelligence Tests Possible and Necessary? 12 J. 
RIlSIlARCH DEV. EDue. 3, 6, 11 (Winter 1979). 
J33 See, e.g., Hilliard, supra note 81. 
134 Of course, community control would not satisfy those parents who would be a 
racial, ethnic or ideological minority within their own community. If a majority in a 
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If people who are otherwise excluded from the political process 
are allowed to determine what and how their children will be taught, 
they will regain control of an ingredient necessary to effective partici-
pation in the political process. In other words, they will take an impor-
tant step toward recapturing their first amendment rights. 
Supporters of proposals to remove the schools from the public 
sector have argued that their proposals will result in greater parental 
influence over the schools their children attend. 135 But in any school 
system those who control the school will promote values and ideals 
that best serve their own interests. As long as schools are controlled by 
the groups that presently command substantial financial resources and 
political muscle, they will continue to reflect the interests of those 
limited groups. Meaningful choice among schools will exist only when 
the diversification of control is maximized: parental choice requires 
parental control. 
Community control of schools for those who have been excluded 
from the political process must involve a conscious and vigorous effort 
to destroy barriers to their involvement. Those who profess to advance 
such a goal must be willing to insure that these barriers are eliminated 
and that advances in the transfer of control are protected in reality as 
well as in theory. 
3. Reeducating the Educators 
Most educators, while professing neutrality, impose their values 
upon their students in an almost self-righteous fashion. This is because 
most fail to recognize that they are transmitting beliefs and self-
interested values rather than objective truths. 
The teacher who has been taught a Eurocentric version of history 
has no reason to believe that his imposition of that history upon a black 
child is tantamount to belief coercion. This means that a necessary first 
step toward the preservation of first amendment freedoms must involve 
the reeducation of educators to help them recognize their own values 
racially mixed community put its version of a "good education" into the curriculum, 
and excluded minority views, the members of the minority might be prompted to move 
to a neighborhood where they would be the majority, thereby creating more segregated 
neighborhoods. 
135 See Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System 
for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 321, 336 (1971). 
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and realize how, naturally, even unconsciously they relay those values 
when teaching. Moreover, it is not enough that teachers confront their 
own deeply embedded values; they must also (and perhaps more 
significantly) be sensitized to, the values of the particular racial and 
socioeconomic communities that entrust to them the education of their 
young. A teacher who is well aware of his own values and teaches 
them as possible alternatives is far preferable to a teacher who con-
siders his values as objective truth. The success of such reeducation of 
educators depends upon their accepting diversity of values as a valid 
expression of individuality, as a necessity for the health of the political 
process and as something the first amendment was designed to pro-
tect. 136 
D. Legal Solutions, Political Realities 
It is important to think politically as well as constitutionally about 
the significance of remedies for school socialization. While reforms in 
136 Freire has proposed an alternative for the revolutionary educator. If educators 
are willing to enter into a "dialogical encounter" with those they seek to educate, "to 
respect the view of the world held by the people," to reflect their aspirations, to expose 
society's contradictions and present them with challenges which require them to 
respond, the people will perceive that education is vitalizing rather then destructive 
and will therefore learn. P. FREIRE, supra note 2, at 83. 
However, even a system of education that fosters tolerance might expose some 
school children to values their own parents might reject. For example, many parents 
believe that their values are objectively true (e.g., ordained by God or history), and 
they would object if their children were taught that values are relative and a matter of 
personal choice. Some parents even object to the democratic values of tolerance, free 
expression and diversity; these parents would certainly object if their children were 
taught beliefs antithetical to their own. The parents' right to such beliefs is of course 
protected by the very first amendment they reject. See, e.g., Collins v. Smith, 578 
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cerro de/lied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); National Socialist White 
People's Party V. Pingers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973); Village of Skokie V. 
National Socialist Party, 69 III. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (per curiam). Ifparents 
have a first amendment right to determine what values their c~iIdren are taught, then 
the rights of intolerant parents are denied by teaching their children tolerance. Even 
well-meaning efforts to give equal time to differing views would not dispose of the 
dilemma. But at least more tolerant teacher attitudes in the public schools would 
infringe the rights of fewer people and infringe them less severely than would intoler-
ant propagation of any narrower official doctrine. 
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the areas of testing, parental participation and teacher attitudes within 
the public schools do not bring conflicting constitutional values into 
play, they are likely to encounter strong political resistance. The test-
ing industry has strong economic interests at stake that it will not easily 
relinquish. 137 Nor will those who are advantaged by present test bias 
be eager to give up that privilege. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court 
has turned a deaf ear to constitutional attacks on standardized tests 
based on the equal protection clause. 138 It is unlikely that the Court 
will be more sympathetic to challenges based on a less wen-established 
first amendment theory. 
The massive resistance of professional educators to the participa-
tion of poor and minority parents in school governance was docu-
mented during the struggle for community control in the New York 
City schools.!3 9 There is little reason to believe there has been sub-
stantial change in the self-interested politics of predominantly white 
teachers' unions located in predominantly nonwhite school districts. It 
is equally unlikely that a series of sensitivity training sessions will 
significantly change the attitudes of these teachers towards their stu-
dents. 
Given the experience of minority communities in their struggles 
to eradicate racism within the public school system, it should not be 
surprising that one encounters skepticism about the ability of existing 
constitutional and statutory provisions to resist the racism that may 
well accompany innovations designed to maximize school choice. The 
courts have proven an uncertain ally in the struggle to make reality of 
the promise of the Civil War amendments, and minorities have learned 
that combatting racism in schooling involves more than the existence 
of formal legal protections. Instead, what minority parents see is that 
inner-city schools have become increasingly segregated because white 
137 The "nonprofit" Educational Testing Service, which administers the NTE, 
has an annual income of more than $80 million. See generally Fallows, The Test and 
the Brightest: How Fair are the College Boards? ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1980, at 
37-48; Kiersh, Testing is the Name, Power is the Game, The Village Voice, Jan. 15, 
1979, at 1. 
138 See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
139 M. BERUBE & M. GITTEL, CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE 
(1969); M. FANTINI, M. GITTEL & R. MAGAT, COMMUNITY CONTROL AND THE 
URBAN SCHOOL (1970); D. RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS (1974). 
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parents can afford to take their children to the suburbs or send them to 
private schools. It is hardly surprising that they are opposed to making 
white flight more affordable. Advocates of proposals supporting 
school choice have argued: 1) that segregated schools are illegal and 
will remain so, 2) that privately run schools cannot be much more 
segregated than the present publicly run ones, 3) that black parents will 
now have the resources to follow the white parents in their flight from 
the public schools and 4) that safeguards and incentives will be built 
into the new legislation to insure that segregation in our schools will 
not increase. 
But the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the applicability of 
Brown v. Board of Education to private schools notwithstanding, 140 
the Court has been increasingly reluctant to apply provisions of the 
fourteenth amendment to even the most heavily regulated private insti-
tutions.'4 1 It is similarly easier to persuade legislatures and public 
administrators to take responsibility for the actions of public entities 
rather than private ones. The only appropriate response to the argu-
ment that "things can't get much worse" is: "they can." Further-
more, once segregation is cloaked in the honorific rhetoric of first 
amendment freedom the damage that is done will be even harder to 
rectify. 
Minorities and the poor are extremely skeptical of those economic 
theories that tell them that given an equal number of dollars they will 
have equal purchasing power and thereby have access to the same or 
equivalent educational opportunities. The same dollars buy them 
poorer food and housing. Why should it be any different with educa-
tion? Blacks have had even less success in influencing the values and 
actions of landlords, merchants and lenders in their neighborhoods 
than they have had with the public schools. 142 
Finally, while the authors of various free choice proposals prom-
ise that special attention will be given to measures to guard against 
140 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
141 See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouser 
under contract to the state); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) 
(utility company); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holder of 
state-issued liquor license). 
142 D. CAPLOVlTZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 12-31, 94-104 (1967); M. 
HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 139-57 (1962). 
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further segregation of our schools, 143 blacks have little confidence that 
such measures will survive a political climate dominated by proposals 
to balance the budget, suits claiming "reverse discrimination," and 
legislation designed to prohibit busing to achieve racial balance. 
The suggestion that we remove the schools from government 
control has come at just the point when blacks and other minorities are 
gaining control of government at the local level where most school 
decisions are made. They are being asked to abandon majoritarian 
processes when they have finally become a significant and effective-
political majority in many localities. The forces that have kept minori-
ties from acting in their own self-interest where they are a majority are 
not likely to disappear once schools are isolated from the democratic 
process. On the contrary, it is probable that once isolated from that 
process those forces will become even more firmly entrenched. 
In the final analysis it would appear that where racial minorities 
and the poor are concerned the question is not so much how to protect 
the minority from the imposition of majority values as how to protect 
those who are relatively powerless from having the values of the pow-
erful imposed upon them. If school financing that provides maximum 
choice can do no more than provide minorities a choice among schools 
controlled by those persons who presently control the private sector, 
there is little more than the opportunity to leap from the frying pan into 
the fire. And if majority opposition to ending standardized testing, 
establishing community control, and reeducating teachers continues, 
the absence of family choice in schooling will perpetuate both racism 
and the manipulation of consciousness. 
One is tempted to conclude, therefore, that while the legal protec-
tions against racism in schools could be sufficient to insure that 
increased parental liberty would not mean increased racial discrimina-
tion, legal protection and political reality are not necessarily the same. 
The first amendment is massively abused by the present structure and 
ideology of schooling. Changes enhancing family choice and taming 
the forces of conformity in schooling are needed. It is politics which 
will determine whether these changes are achieved for the equal benefit 
of all families or simply as instruments for perpetuating the status quo 
in a new form. 
143 See J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 97; C. JENCKS, supra note 98. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this essay we have examined a variety of ways in 
which the ideology and structure of schooling infringe upon first 
amendment rights and undercut the political process. Through first 
amendment analysis we have tried to add another dimension to the 
traditional understanding of how poor, working-class and minority 
families are victimized by their lack of power over schooling deci-
sions. Although "practical" people may find it disconcerting, we have 
pointed to a problem without offering a solution. 
At bottom we conceive this problem as an issue of power-how 
is the power to use the schools' inevitable value-inculcation process 
distributed among those for whom access to the political process is at 
stake? Whether the power of involuntary school socialization is held 
by the political majority, a governmental entity, an interest group or a 
private organization intimately involved with the business of educa-
tion, the damage to the individual's freedom of expression is the same, 
and the threat to the health of the first amendment and the political 
system is as great. We have offered a broad interpretation of the mod-
ern meaning of the first' amendment and value inculcation in schooling 
that requires a broad understanding of how the inequitable allocation of 
power over education distorts the system of freedom of expression. 
We suspect that those who focus solely upon the separation of 
school and state that might be accomplished through a voucher system 
will find that they have failed to address powerful forces that will 
continue to deprive parents of control over value inculcation in 
schools. 144 Standardized testing in admission and promotion decisions 
as well as lack of understanding of discipline problems may render 
family choice among schools a mere illusion. 
We suspect also that those who, in the name of opening up the 
system of freedom of expression and the political process, advocate 
changes in schools such as the elimination of standardized testing or 
the reform of conformist teaching will eventually discover that their 
goals are thwarted by an absence of equal family choice among 
schools. In matters as personal as the formation of conscience there 
144 See the discussion of the proposed revision of school financing in California, 
sllpra note 98. 
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will always be dissenters; and if the first amendment has any meaning 
it is that dissenters may not be subjected to majority coercion no matter 
how enlightened the values of the majority may become. 
If this essay contributes to an understanding of the ways that 
schools damage the political process, and increases skepticism about 
school reforms that do not take account of value inculcation, it may be 
regarded as useful. If this essay contributes to an increased public 
discussion of the first amendment and schooling it will have satisfied 
its authors' best intentions. 
